Communicating risk in major incidents: The public's perception by Swan, L et al.
12th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP12 
Vancouver, Canada, July 12-15, 2015 
 1 
Communicating Risk in Major Incidents: the Public’s Perception 
Lauren Swan 
PhD Candidate, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, England 
Sara Waring 
Dr, Dept. of Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, England 
Laurence Alison 
Professor, Dept. of Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, England 
Michael Beer 
Professor, Institute for Risk and Uncertainty, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, England 
ABSTRACT: There are many examples of unpredicted natural and man-made disasters occurring over 
the past few decades, for example Hillsborough (1989) and the 7/7 Bombings (2005). Most of these 
incidents led to legislative reform to either improve infrastructure or the operational response, in an 
attempt to minimise future risks. However, suggested changes have not taken into consideration how to 
manage and communicate risk to the public. This is despite the impact that ineffective risk 
communication could have on both potential casualties and the environment. For example, during the 
Fukushima accident (2011) people were evacuated from light radioactive areas and ended up in more 
heavily contaminated areas, partly due to poor risk communication (Robertson et al., 2012). In order to 
investigate the current status of acceptance from the public when receiving risk information in an 
emergency, a large-scale live multi-agency training event was developed. This event was based on a 
ferry collision, which resulted in the release of a potential contaminant, requiring members of the 
public to undergo mass decontamination. Data was collected using questionnaires and conducting post 
incident debriefs with a total of 53 members of the public who played the role of ‘passengers’ on-board 
the ferry. Data was analysed using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Findings 
indicate that the operational element was accepted, and often praised, but participants had problems 
with the non-technical side of the response, particularly the communication; this had a significant 
impact on the perception of the services involved. It is recommended that there is more frequent, clear 
and direct communication given to the public throughout a disaster as it will potentially increase the 
level of compliance and reassurance, and will reduce anxiety. This will benefit the agencies involved as 
effective communication has been found to increase trust and promote future confidence in agencies 
(Carter et al., 2013). This research has future implications for policy making, disaster management, and 
improving risk communication to members of the public. 
 
Over the past few decades there have been many 
major incidents, which are defined by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (pg.13, 
2009) as, ‘any emergency that requires the 
implementation of special arrangements by one 
or more of the emergency services, and generally 
includes the involvement, either directly or 
indirectly, of large numbers of people’. Whether 
natural or man-made all have been unpredictable, 
unexpected and have had disastrous 
consequences. For example, the Hillsborough 
disaster (1989) resulted in the death of 96 people 
and led to a public enquiry in which 
recommendations were made to improve the 
design and structure of football stadiums (Lord 
Justice Taylor, 1989). In 2005, the 7/7 bombings 
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saw the alteration of the Terrorism Act, and the 
Buncefield fire led to suggested improvements 
concerning the operation of fuel storage sites 
(Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007).  
The majority of post incident 
recommendations centre on improving the 
infrastructure or operational response in order to 
prevent reoccurrence. Although these 
recommendations are beneficial, disasters are 
unlikely to occur in exactly the same way again. 
However, managing the public will always be 
something which is necessary in any major 
incident, especially as they frequently behave in 
ways which are undesirable, unanticipated and 
may have disastrous but avoidable consequences 
(Mintz, 1951).  
For example, in the King’s Cross 
underground fire (1987) victim’s actions were 
consistent with the usual rules they would follow 
in that setting, showing learnt behaviour which 
had not been adapted in the fire. It was found 
that the majority of victims had attempted to exit 
the burning station via the same route they 
entered or by the exit they had originally planned 
to depart from; this behaviour was a contributing 
factor to the 31 deaths in this incident (Donald & 
Canter, 1992).  The location of the bodies also 
indicated that there was some structure in the 
sequence of actions from the victims, albeit 
inappropriate, therefore contradicting the 
common assumption that the public panic and act 
irrationally in an emergency (Donald et al, 
1992). If the commuters had been given clear 
and direct information to inform them of what to 
do in this unusual situation they would have 
understood how to behave and the consequences 
may have been different. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that 
individuals under duress exhibit cognitive 
problems (Leach & Ansell, 2008; Porter & 
Leach, 2010). This impairment could in turn 
limit an individual’s ability to undertake actions 
to mediate the impact of the threat; making 
flexible interaction difficult (Porter et al, 2010). 
This could result in a victim who is cognitively 
unable to aid their own survival (Leach, 1994). 
Therefore verbal direction given by emergency 
responders, and potentially physically, is vital in 
order to lead people to safety. However, 
responders are often highly trained when it 
comes to the operational elements of a major 
incident response but are not trained to the same 
standard when it comes to managing the public’s 
unexpected actions with effective risk 
communication (Robertson & Pengilley 2012).  
The purpose of risk communication is to 
influence people to avoid dangers and to 
encourage co-operative planning; this is essential 
in a major incident (Hilton, 2008). 
Unfortunately, this is not always carried out 
effectively, the Fukushima nuclear accident 
(2011) is an example of this. Many of the 
unexposed people in Japan could have been 
managed by effective communication; instead it 
was reported that the responsible agencies 
repeatedly played down the risks of the affected 
areas, causing people to evacuate from low 
affected to more highly affected risk areas 
(Robertson et al, 2012). This dysfunctional 
public response of mass self-evacuation possibly 
contributed to the death toll of over 15,000 
people (Robertson et al., 2012).   
Although incidents as serious as Fukushima 
are infrequent, nuclear energy companies still 
have to work harder when interacting with the 
public in order to change negative perceptions 
and to gain acceptance (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1989). This is supported by findings, which 
indicate that effective communication could 
increase trust and confidence in agencies (Carter, 
Drury & Rubin, 2012). Emergency responders’ 
interactions have also been found to affect the 
public’s experience and compliance with 
decontamination procedures; failure to 
communicate effectively can lead to anxiety 
about the process (Carter et al, 2012). 
This article reports the findings from a 
simulated major incident in which members of 
the public acted as casualties. The aim of this 
research is to explore how casualties rate the 
emergency service response and communication 
given to them in a major incident.  
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1. METHODOLOGY 
1.1.1. The exercise: KMAF Warrior 
Operation KMAF Warrior was a large-scale 
multi-agency training event that took place on 6th 
March 2014. The exercise scenario involved a 
ferry colliding with another vessel, resulting in 
the dispersal of an unknown white powder that 
was a potential contaminant to ferry passengers, 
played by participants. This meant that people on 
board the vessel had to undergo mass 
decontamination.  
Agencies involved in this exercise included 
a ferry company, the Fire and Rescue Service, 
the Police, the Hazardous Area Response Team, 
the Red Cross, St John’s Ambulance, a travel 
company, National Health Service 
representatives, the Coastguard, local media, 
local councils and the Environmental Agency. 
1.1.2. Participants 
There were approximately 70 people who acted 
as casualties in this exercise, although only 53 
people participated in this research. Participants 
were aged between 18 and 59, with a mean age 
was 23, and they were predominantly female 
(40/53). The majority of participants were 
students from the University of Liverpool 
(44/53) and the rest of the participants were from 
external agencies such as Red Cross. Role 
players were unaware of the exercise scenario 
and were only told that they would be going on a 
ferry; this presented a level of realism for them 
and the emergency services throughout the 
exercise.  
1.1.3. Measures 
Pre event questionnaires were completed 4 
weeks prior to the event and post event 
questionnaires were completed immediately 
following the event. Questionnaires were chosen 
as they do not require the presence of skilled 
researchers, allowing information to be gathered 
on specific topics and requiring less time to 
complete than interviews (Crandall, Klein & 
Hoffman, 2006). Questionnaires asked a range of 
questions that required quantitative responses, 
which allowed direct comparisons to be made 
between perceptions pre and post event in order 
to identify whether they altered. In both 
questionnaires, participants were asked to score 
their agreements from 1-10 (1=Strongly 
Disagree, 10=Strongly Agree) to a set of 
statements. Qualitative questions were also 
included in order to provide a rationale for the 
scores given (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013). 
This mixed method approach was utilized as it 
provides a better understanding of the research 
problem (Guest et al., 2013).  
In addition to questionnaires, the majority of 
participants took part in a post-event debrief, 
which allowed participants to explore concepts 
and discuss certain aspects of their experiences 
with one other. Debriefs lead people through a 
series of questions that allow them to reflect on a 
recent experience in a non-punitive environment; 
they also encourage people to construct their 
own meanings for their actions and aids in them 
identifying lessons for the future (Tannenbaum 
& Cerasoli, 2013).  
1.1.4. Analytical procedure 
As the questionnaires had a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative questions they were 
analysed in two ways. Firstly, T-tests were 
conducted on the quantitative data using SPSS to 
identify whether perception ratings of emergency 
services significantly altered pre and post event 
(Field, 2009). Secondly, qualitative responses to 
open-ended questions were analysed using a 
thematic framework as this flexible approach 
allows data to be described in rich detail and is 
particularly useful for investigating data when 
the participant’s ideas are unknown, as with this 
exploratory study (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Debriefs were all recorded and transcribed 
before also being analysed using a thematic 
approach; this allowed codes to be generated in a 
systematic fashion across the entire dataset 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Furthermore, a check of 
inter-rater reliability was carried out on these 
themes, which revealed an 86% agreement 
between the researchers and a colleague; 
indicating a high level of agreement. 
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Table 1: Pre and post exercise comparisons (1= strongly disagree, 10= strongly agree) 
Statements 
Pre event Post event 
df t 
sig (2 
tailed)* Mean SD Mean SD 
I trust the Fire and Rescue Service 9.33 0.96 8.39 2.05 35 2.69 0.01 
I have confidence in the Fire and Rescue Service 9.25 0.94 8.33 2.09 35 2.51 0.02 
I would comply with instructions given by the emergency 
services 
9.22 1.27 9.03 1.91 35 0.50 0.60 
I trust the Ambulance Service 9.19 0.92 9.58 2.02 35 1.73 0.09 
I have confidence in the Ambulance service 9.00 1.04 8.28 2.40 35 1.67 0.10 
I feel the emergency services understand my concerns 9.03 0.77 6.58 2.77 35 5.79 0.01 
I have confidence in the Police 8.61 0.90 8.03 1.83 35 1.90 0.07 
I trust the Police 8.53 0.91 7.86 2.27 35 1.74 0.09 
I prefer to know the procedures of the emergency services 8.00 1.47 8.72 2.01 35 -1.89 0.68 
I am happy with the amount of information the emergency 
services share with the public 
7.67 1.22 5.64 2.24 35 5.60 0.01 
I know how the emergency services respond in disasters 7.19 1.56 7.61 2.36 35 -0.89 0.38 
*Sig <0.05 
 
2. RESULTS 
2.1. Quantitative analysis 
See Table 1 for full results. Following the 
exercise, participants had significantly less trust 
and confidence in the fire and rescue service, 
although it was still relatively high. There was 
also a decrease in the confidence people had in 
the ambulance service and police post exercise 
however these findings were not statistically 
significant. Overall, the public had the least trust 
in police both pre and post incident compared to 
the other two emergency services.  
Results indicated that after the exercise there 
was a significant decrease in the extent to which 
people felt their concerns were understood by the 
emergency services and people were 
significantly less satisfied with the amount of 
information the emergency services share with 
the public. Furthermore, after the exercise people 
felt they would comply to a greater extent with 
instructions given by the emergency services, 
there was an increase in preferences to know 
emergency service procedures and people were 
more certain of how emergency services respond 
in disasters; however none of these results were 
found to be statically significant. 
2.2. Qualitative analysis 
In total, 372 quotes (6955 words), approximately 
30% of the whole data set, were identified and 
extracted. From this data 4 themes were 
identified: communication (144 quotes = 38.7%), 
perception of agencies (140 quotes =37.6%), cost 
vs benefit of participation (63 quotes = 16.9%) 
and experienced emotions (25 quotes = 6.7%). A 
description of the themes, along with examples 
of quotes can be found below. 
2.2.1. Communication 
A lack of communication was undoubtedly the 
most prevalent theme to emerge throughout the 
data set. People reported a lack of 
communication at all stages of the exercise 
although this was more predominant when 
undergoing mass decontamination. Even though 
the procedure was potentially challenging, as it 
involved undressing, people often praised the 
procedural elements of it.  However the lack of 
communication and verbal instructions given 
was a common criticism: 
 ‘…I just think communication was really bad. 
Apart from that it was all really good.’  
This lack of communication had many 
implications for passengers such as feeling 
confused and uninformed: 
‘Communicate with people and tell them what is 
going on because it was not enjoyable being left 
in the dark’  
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This also had physical implications, such as 
people not wearing the protective clothing 
correctly; although it is uncertain if this was non-
compliance with procedures was on purpose or 
through the perceived lack of direction. 
‘People didn’t have their masks on’ 
It was reported in this exercise that people 
did not follow instructions given to them. 
Whether done on purpose or not, non-
compliance in a real incident would be a serious 
issue which could cause more harm: 
‘Well I didn’t wipe my face or blow my nose’  
Furthermore, not being given enough 
information caused people to imitate other 
people’s behaviour; this is also a concern as it 
would be easy for people to copy incorrect 
actions or behaviours which again could cause 
further contamination in a real incident. 
However, in this case it worked in favour of the 
responder as people seemed to copy the correct 
behaviours: 
‘Once inside we were given relatively little 
information on what to do next but people begun 
to put on the suits provided in the packs so I 
followed suit’  
The problems with communication could 
have been rectified by communicating more 
frequently with casualties, even if it means 
responders repeating themselves or using a loud 
hailer. This is further supported by questionnaire 
responses in which people reported that 
challenges could be overcome by more frequent 
communication as well as clearer instructions 
and guidance. Although they were sometimes 
criticised for their operational response, the Ferry 
Service received praise for trying to consistently 
interact with people on board the Ferry:  
 ‘They actually gave information on the ferry. 
They hadn’t a clue what they were doing but at 
least they were trying to tell you something…’  
This highlights the fact that more 
communication is beneficial for the people and 
the perception of the service, it also links to the 
following theme. 
2.2.2. Perception of agencies 
The way people felt about the involved was a 
common theme to emerge in this study; some 
participants perceived their task to be to evaluate 
the performance of these agencies. It is useful to 
know what the public perceptions of agencies are 
as it highlights what factors people value about 
the service and provides clear suggestions for 
improvement. Although it is important to notice 
that this differs from person to person: 
 ‘I feel that it was fun but if anything I have less 
confidence in the emergency services’  
 ‘Everything went smoothly, the members of the 
emergency services were confident, they were 
able to do everything with control.’ 
Authority was a factor that appeared to 
affect how people regarded the agencies 
involved. Being authoritative was a preference of 
the public; agencies not giving orders and 
allowing members of the public to dictate their 
actions seemed to impact on how they were 
perceived: 
‘It would have been nicer had they made orders 
and stuck to them…’  
‘The staff shouldn’t rely on the medical, just 
because they say they are medical students, you 
know, they might be first year. So, I thought that 
was a bit questionable.’ 
Members of the public also noted that they 
were often unsure of which agencies the 
practitioners they encountered was a part of. 
Although agencies were wearing uniforms on the 
day, it may be that these were not particularly 
clear, especially the uniforms which were 
required for the decontamination. In this 
exercise, it may have caused people to attribute 
negative perceptions to the wrong agencies. 
Furthermore, in a major incident it is important 
that people know which agency is which so they 
can ask for the correct help:  
‘Who are the people in green?’  
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People often compared this exercise to a real 
emergency and seemed to believe that the 
agencies would not make the identified mistakes 
in a real emergency. This is also a good way to 
inadvertently understand what improvements 
participants would like to see being made. For 
example: 
 ‘… [If real] they would be telling ya what too. 
Well I hope that they would.’  
It is also apparent that members of the 
public want the emergency responder dealing 
with them in an emergency to do the best that 
they can do. If the public were not happy with 
certain aspects of the response, they still tried to 
see the good side of the emergency responders 
and defended the actions of that agency. The 
most common defence was that it was because it 
was a training exercise; however in a real 
emergency the public would not have this 
defence.  
‘I don’t think it was their fault, they just need to 
be trained’ 
‘…maybe if it was a real thing they would react 
differently’ 
2.2.3. Cost vs Benefits of participation 
Throughout the data set there are numerous 
references to the costs and benefits of taking part 
in this exercise. Although this is a theme that is 
difficult to generalise to a real emergency, it 
demonstrates what should be considered in a real 
emergency in order to keep people satisfied.  
Many people stated that waiting an 
unnecessary amount of time on the Ferry and 
again before going through the decontamination 
was unacceptable. Another problem that people 
had with taking part was the lack of urgency; this 
led to a decreased level of realism in the 
exercise. Members of the emergency services not 
taking it seriously made it difficult for the 
participants to play distressed passengers 
realistically as in a real emergency they would 
expect responders to have some urgency:  
‘So erm...yeah then we were kind of waiting 
around to be decontaminated. It wasn’t very 
urgent, it wasn’t as if it was an emergency, it 
was just like we were waiting for something…’  
It is also important to point out that some 
participants did not take the event seriously too. 
Conversely, certain participants affected the 
experience by taking their role too seriously and 
dictating to others.  
‘The 5th year medical students, they were like 
really dominating what was going on. They were 
even giving instructions to like the fire-fighters’ 
The most common benefit seemed to be 
what people learnt on the day; a lot of people 
appreciated learning the decontamination 
procedure as well as how people work and 
interact in an incident. This was also the most 
prevalent answer on the questionnaire.  
‘The overall exercise was a great experience 
helping me to learn about decontamination 
procedure and the emergency services. It also 
helps you understand what a real event like this 
would be like.’ 
2.2.4. Experiencing emotions  
People experiencing real emotions is another 
important theme to emerge as it proves how 
realistic this event was and gives an indication of 
what can be expected in a real incident. 
Accordingly, this suggests that the findings of 
the present study may be generalizable to real 
emergencies as experiencing real emotion 
indicates that the exercise was realistic. 
 As highlighted in the previous theme, many 
people enjoyed taking part in the exercise and so 
experienced positive emotions such as 
excitement: 
‘It was exciting and at many points it was 
realistic and sometimes even real emotions got 
evoked in me’  
Uncertainty was repeatedly experienced by 
people but for different reasons. This feeling of 
uncertainty could be greatly reduced by keeping 
people informed and communicating with them 
so they know what is going on, this is evident 
throughout the questionnaire where people 
12th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP12 
Vancouver, Canada, July 12-15, 2015 
 7 
openly state they felt confused or unsure of what 
to do.  
‘I kind of feel like, I felt like it was one really 
confusing assault course and I feel like in an 
emergency you shouldn’t feel like you’d just 
gone through an assault course’ 
3. DISCUSSION 
This study took a novel approach to gain an in 
depth insight into the experiences of casualties 
during a major incident, the communication they 
received and the impact that the response may 
have had on agencies. It is hoped that work in 
this area can aid in improving emergency service 
response in a major incident. The overarching 
finding of this study was that emergency 
responders, and other agencies in contact with 
the public, do not communicate with casualties 
effectively or sufficiently. A lack of effective 
communication was consistently found in the 
questionnaires and during the post-event debrief; 
this had an impact on the participants’ perception 
of the agencies involved. 
The findings from this study, in the themes 
of ‘communication’ and ‘perception of agencies’ 
in particular, highlight the negative impact that 
inadequate communication can have on an 
agency’s reputation. There was also a decrease in 
the scores of trust and confidence in the agencies 
that did not communicate well. Furthermore, 
inadequate communication made the participants 
anxious and uncertain. This outcome suggests 
that improving communication is a key 
consideration that needs to be made by agencies. 
This also supports other research which states 
that agencies rarely train in the human element of 
the response (Robertson et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, people were not complying 
with procedures by not wearing the uniform 
correctly or following instructions. Although it is 
unknown if this was an intentional action or 
whether people genuinely did not know what to 
do, it still indicates that non-compliance is a 
possibility if communications are not clear and 
direct. This is something that needs addressing 
because in a real emergency involving a 
contaminant this could cause further harm. This 
supports previous research, which has found a 
positive correlation between effectiveness of 
communication and conformity (Carter et al., 
2012).  
Improving communication is also necessary 
as emergencies are rare and casualties don’t 
know how to best behave appropriately unless 
the correct information is given to them clearly 
and timely (Donald et al, 1992) as well as clearly 
and directly (Leach, 1994). If this were a real 
incident not telling people that they had to 
undergo  decontamination could have had serious 
implications as people may have left the terminal 
still contaminated and so dispersing the 
potentially dangerous chemical further. 
Additionally, people actually requested this type 
of information and so it supports the necessity of 
sufficient communication.  
It is important to note that this data was 
taken from just one exercise and so findings may 
be specific to this group of people; therefore it 
needs to be replicated with other agencies to 
confidently generalise findings. Furthermore, 
Carter et al (2012) has found that communication 
is problematic in mass decontaminations in 
general and so it would be useful to repeat the 
study using a different exercise scenario. 
Findings could also be different in a real major 
incident as this was only a training exercise.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The findings presented in this study support the 
idea that responding services need to be trained 
in how to effectively communicate risks to 
members of the public during major incidents. 
They need to be clear and direct with members 
of the public in order to ensure instructions are 
followed. It also proved that effective 
communications can benefit the agencies as 
casualties will feel more reassured and less 
uncertain; this can positively impact how people 
feel about the agency post incident. As found in 
the study, members of the public have high 
expectations for emergency responders and want 
them to be the best that they can be.  
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Even though this was a rare approach to 
data collection, the intention to study people’s 
perceptions in order to improve outcomes in 
disasters is not unusual as this was studied over 
60 years ago (Mintz, 1951) but unfortunately 
lessons have not been learnt. In this exercise no 
grievous harm was caused but real incidents are 
still occurring where people are making the same 
mistakes. However, agencies involved in this 
exercise have given some members of the public 
an opportunity to understand what it would be 
like to be part of an emergency which can help 
their cognitive processing if it were to happen for 
real (Donald et al, 1992). Furthermore, it is 
hoped that recommendations made will be taken 
on board by the people involved to avoid the 
similar mistakes occurring for real as the 
consequences can be fatal. 
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